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Abstract
The main interest of this paper is to compare the value of education systems of different
countries. For this reason I use data on workers who have completed their education before
immigrating to Switzerland to estimate a country specific return to education. I estimate
the standard Mincer-equation with the extension that I additionally allow for country
specific returns to education. Results show that there are important differences between
the returns to different education systems within Switzerland in the value of the basic
education on the one hand and the return to an additional year of education on the other
hand.
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1 Introduction
The aim of this paper is to compare the value of education systems of different countries.
Since the seminal work of Becker (1964) economists discuss educational choices in the
context of a utility maximizing person who invests as long in education as the present
value of the costs of investment equals the present value of the returns of the investment.
The Mincerian wage equation (Mincer (1974)) allows to calculate this return to education.
Regressing a semilogarithmic function with the log wage as a dependent variable and the
years of schooling and some additional control variables as regressor variables provide the
economic value of an additional year of education as a percentage wage increase. Card
(1994) shows the relation between the optimal level of schooling according to Becker and
the return to education according to Mincer. This method has been applied in hundreds
of studies with different setups and for nearly every country of the world.1 The results
are stable over time and vary little across countries between 5% and 10% of wage increase
per year of schooling.
Table 1 shows selected estimation results for the countries of interest presented in Har-
mon and Westergaard-Nielsen (2001). The return to education differs between countries
and between men and women. Interestingly the countries with the highest returns for men
are Portugal and the UK, while the return to education for women is highest in Germany
and Switzerland. One reason for the differences between countries might be the differ-
ences of the education systems described in the appendix. Beside this there may exist
differences in the labor markets or the institutional settings. In some of the countries it is
more critical to have compulsory schooling, in others additional schooling might be more
important. Some countries do have stronger unions and thus a more compressed wage
structure, other countries might be more liberal. Thus estimating the return to education
within different countries might not reveal the real return but the return plus some labor
market specific components.
In this study I compare the value of education systems of different countries within
one country. I look at the return to education of foreigners who have completed their
education in their home country but work in Switzerland. The advantage of this strategy
is that I concentrate on one labor market instead of multiple labor markets to calculate the
return to education and that I look at workers who all need a working permission of the
immigration office (Fremdenpolizei). Switzerland is a good candidate for this approach
1Psacharopoulos and Patrinos (2002) provide a huge set of returns to education for different countries
and years. They distinguish between the private and the social return to education. In this paper I
concentrate on the private return. For Europe the two-year PURE (Public funding and private Returns
to Education) project, which started in November 1998 and studied among other things the dispersion of
private returns to education in 15 European Countries, provides a very broad pool of comparable returns.
(Asplund and Pereira (1999) and Harmon et al. (2001))
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Table 1: Return to Education in Europe
Men Women
Austria 0.069 0.067
Germany 0.079 0.098
Netherlands 0.063 0.045
Portugal 0.097 0.079
France 0.075 0.057
UK 0.094 0.079
Italy 0.062 0.046
Finland 0.086 0.088
Spain 0.072 0.084
Switzerland 0.090 0.095
Source: Harmon and Westergaard-Nielsen (2001)
Note: Turkey was not part of this study.
for several reasons. First,each foreigner who applies for a job in Switzerland has to fulfill
two conditions to get an permission: (1) The potential employer has to have vacancies
for foreigners (There are limited working places for foreigners which are allocated by the
immigration office). (2) the potential employer has to prove that there is no Swiss who
is at least as qualified for the job as the applicant.2 These rules are valuable because
they assure that only foreign workers are employed who have a standardized quality.
Second, Switzerland has a diverse an significant foreign workforce. About 25 % of the
labor force are foreigners of which more than 50 % are either citizens of the EU or the
EFTA (Bundesamt fu¨r Statistik (2004)). In 1998 only Luxembourg had a higher fraction
of foreign workforce (57.7 %) while all other European countries had a foreign labor force
below 10 % (OECD (2001).
To analyze the return of different education systems I estimate the standard Mincer-
equation with the extension that I include a country specific intercept and additionally
interact the years of schooling with the nationality. Results show that there are significant
differences between the returns to different education systems in Switzerland in the value
of the basic education on the one hand and the return to an additional year of education
on the other hand.
To validate my findings I compare the estimated returns to additional education with
returns provided in table (1) and the returns to basic education with the PISA scores. The
first is uncorrelated (women) or even negative correlated (man) and indicates the possible
importance of estimating returns to education within one labor market. The positive
correlation with the PISA scores suggests that the economic value of education and the
2Since June 2002 (coming into effect of the bilateral agreements between Switzerland and the EU) the
rules are stepwise released. Since June 2004 regulation (2) is suspended, while regulation (1) will hold
until June 2007. I use data of 2002 and 2003, thus these changes do not affect my results.
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quality of schooling are somewhat comparable.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section I introduce the data and show
some descriptive statistics before I discuss the estimation method in section 3. In section
4 I provide and discuss the estimation results. Section 5 concludes this paper.
2 The Data and Descriptive Statistics
In this paper I use the Swiss Labor Force Survey (SLFS) 2002 and 2003. In general the
SLFS is a yearly telephone based interview of randomly selected households, including
Swiss and foreigners who permanently live in Switzerland, which contains very rich in-
formation about the working life and the personal situation of individuals. The SLFS
2003 includes a special module on migration in which foreigners are represented superpro-
portional: instead of 20 % of foreigners in the working population this dataset contains
almost 50 % of foreigners. For this study I use a pooled panel of 2002 and 2003 and
concentrate on fulltime employees. I exclude observations of countries with less than 35
observations3. This leads to a sample of 17’092 persons, of which 11’051 are Swiss and
6’041 are foreigners.
Table 2 reports the average years of schooling4 and the average hourly wage5. The
average Swiss earns about 44.86 Swiss Francs per hour and has 13.09 years of education.
Both is slightly higher than the average of all employees. There are big differences between
the nationalities. Additionally the variance within the nationalities differs a lot. Persons
with British or Finish nationalities are both higher educated and earn higher wages while
those from the southern parts of Europe have lower education and lower wages. One
reason might be, that these countries are typical immigration countries.
Table 3 shows the average years of schooling and the average wage for foreigners
who completed education in their country of origin (Foreign Education6) and those who
obtained education completely in Switzerland (Swiss Education7). On the one hand, there
3Finland as the country with the best PISA scores is an exception. Additional I exclude Belgium,
because there is no Belgian who has obtained education in Switzerland. I need this later to evaluate nation
specific characteristics.
4In the SLFS only the highest level of received education is reported. To compare the education systems
I use the numbers of years which are necessary to receive the reported level of education in Switzerland.
This leads to some noise because of the differences in compulsory schooling for example, but with the
SLFS-data it is not possible to use a different approach. However, this procedure allows to compare the
education systems and thus seems to be appropriate.
5Because of the survey character of the data, there are some implausible wages. Thus I eliminate all
observations with a log wage of 4 standard deviations above or below the average log wage.
6Because I do not have information on the country in which a person has completed education directly,
I use the nationality and the age of immigration as proxy. Only persons which immigrate with at least 26
years are selected.
7These are foreigners who were born in Switzerland or immigrated before their 7th birthday.
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Table 2: Education and Wages: All Employees
country Nobs Years of educ. Wage
mean SD mean SD
Germany 873 15.53 3.24 53.25 23.34
Finland 26 16.02 3.42 55.62 18.60
France 560 14.33 3.36 48.47 26.06
United Kingdom 164 16.00 3.52 65.86 34.41
Italy 2,476 11.72 2.48 37.33 14.78
Netherlands 104 15.41 3.05 56.57 27.14
Austria 188 13.81 2.91 45.20 18.74
Portugal 859 10.19 1.87 30.34 10.19
Spain 546 11.45 2.61 37.26 16.61
Turkey 245 11.48 2.99 32.64 12.91
Switzerland 11,051 13.09 2.58 44.86 19.10
SD 17,092 12.89 2.86 43.46 19.60
Source: SLFS 2002 and 2003, own calculations.
are no huge differences among workers from traditional immigration nationalities (with
exception of the education of Spanish and Turkish workers). On the other hand, there
are big differences for nearly all other nationalities. Persons who have obtained Swiss
education have on average less years of education and earn less than those with the same
citizenship. Additional the variation of wages as well as of years of schooling is lower for
those who obtained Swiss education. This might be evidence for selectivity but also for
different returns to education.
Table 3: Education and Wages by Education System
Foreign Education Swiss Education
country Nobs Years of educ. Wage Nobs Years of educ. Wage
mean SD mean SD mean SD mean SD
Germany 623 16.26 3.12 56.00 23.59 36 14.82 3.14 46.74 15.55
Finland 19 16.18 3.15 57.23 20.69 2 13.50 4.95 51.53 18.24
France 374 14.83 3.41 51.90 28.51 21 13.74 2.90 40.42 14.64
UK 122 16.39 3.45 70.23 34.32 9 13.56 3.11 52.54 23.39
Italy 1,032 12.43 2.80 40.56 17.13 349 12.56 2.22 39.65 15.32
Netherl. 72 15.66 3.04 59.73 28.17 6 15.17 3.76 44.21 9.97
Austria 92 14.47 3.20 47.42 17.87 10 14.10 3.04 49.37 28.06
Portugal 347 10.11 1.97 30.59 11.61 24 11.17 1.27 29.70 7.49
Spain 186 11.81 3.15 39.44 18.31 70 13.16 2.72 42.30 19.37
Turkey 74 12.80 3.53 36.55 14.80 23 11.33 2.28 31.40 12.31
Switzerl. 11,051 13.09 2.58 44.86 19.10
Foreigners 13.57 3.62 45.95 23.35 12.79 2.53 40.18 16.32
Source: SLFS 2002 and 2003, own calculations.
Figure 1 shows the distribution of education within the nationalities of interest. It
turns out that there are huge differences between the foreigners from different countries.
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While there are some countries with at least 50 % of persons living in Switzerland who
have completed at least 17 years of education, there also exist some countries where more
than 50 % have at most completed the minimum schooling. It is remarkable that less
than 40 % of all Swiss have completed a higher education than apprenticeship and only
about 20 % have completed university. Even though there are huge differences between
the nationalities, this should be no problem if the wage equation is linear in education.
Nevertheless figure 1 reveals that there are big differences between the different nation-
alities. This might be an indication for selectivity in a way that people with different
education levels have different incentives to migrate to Switzerland.
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Figure 1: Share of Education (Source: SLFS 2002 and 2003, own calculation)
To reduce this selectivity problem I use a variable which indicates the hierarchic posi-
tion of a job. Figure 2 shows the share of the hierarchic position in a job by nationalities.
More than 50% of persons which have completed their education in the UK, Germany or
the Netherlands hold an academic or leading position. On the other hand less than 10 %
of the people who finished their education in Portugal work in a higher position. Even
though the education determines the position of the job strongly, there are differences in
the rank of the countries between the two figures. Including the job position in a regression
allows for comparing persons from different countries within the same hierarchic cell and
thus reduces the problem of selectivity.
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Figure 2: Share of Occupation (Source: SLFS 2002 and 2003, own calculation)
3 Estimation Method
As starting point I use an extended version of the Mincerian wage equation (Mincer
(1974)):
ln(wagei) = α+ β1 · Si + β2 · Expi + β3 · Exp2i +Ψ · β4 + #i (1)
ln(wagei) denotes the natural logarithm of the gross hourly wage rate. The dataset I use
provides information on earnings, paid holiday and working hours, thus it is possible to
construct the gross hourly wage rate. The variable of interest is the numbers of years of
education (Si) with a range from 9 years (compulsory schooling) to 19 years (PhD). It is
measured as the number of years theoretically needed to complete the highest reported
education level. Following Mincer (1974) I use the potential experience8 and its squared
as control variable. Because of the richness of this dataset I am able to control for a lot
of other factors of influence (Ψ). Thus in a first step I include tenure, its square, and a
dummy for female. In a second step I include dummies for the position of a person in its
job and choose craftsmen as default. Including these variables is very important to deal
with the problem of selectivity. Because of the different shortness of skills, it is easier to
immigrate into Switzerland for some levels of qualification while it is more complicated
for other levels. Thus including the job position in a regression allows for comparing
persons from different nationalities within the same hierarchic cell and therefore reduces
the problem of selectivity strongly.9 In two furthers steps I additionally include dummies
8Potential experience is computed as age − years of education − 6.5 as a average school enrollment
age.
9Because of the positive correlation between the years of education and the job position, including
the job position forecloses the interpretation of the slope coefficient β1 as the return to education in the
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for 16 sectors and for the 26 political districts (cantons) of Switzerland.
For the main part of the paper I concentrate on foreigners working in Switzerland. To
estimate the country specific return to education I modify equation (1) slightly:
ln(wagei) = α+ β1 · Si + β2 · Expi + β3 · Exp2i +Ψ · β4 +
+ δUK + δIT + · · · + δPT +
+ γUK · SUKi + γIT · SIti + · · · + γPT · SPti +
+ #i (2)
Instead of estimating one constant and one single return to education for the whole
population I estimate one baseline intercept (α) and one baseline return to education (β1)
for the German system and separate intercepts as well as additional slope coefficients for
each country. Thus for example a person who completed education in the UK experiences
an intercept of αUK = α+δUK and obtains a return to education of (β1,UK = β1+γUK)·Si
for each additional year of schooling. Again I stepwise include additional control variables.
I estimate equation (2) for foreigners with foreign education as well as for foreigners
with Swiss education. While the first regression reveals the differences between the re-
turns to the different education systems and might be biased due to nationality specific
characteristics, the second reveals this nationality specific characteristics. (I discuss this
in the following section in detail)
4 Results
In this section I provide results from the extended Mincer equation. I estimate this re-
gression for all observations. In a second step I concentrate on foreigners to estimate the
education system specific return to education described in equation 2.10
4.1 Return to Education
Table 4 shows the results for all fulltime working persons. In panel (A) I present the
results of the standard Mincer schooling function for more than 17’000 observations. The
return to education is in line with findings in the literature 11 (0.077). Additional the
Mincerian way. Nevertheless this coefficient reveals partly the return to additional education and thus I
will use this expression aware that it is not the same as defined by Mincer (1974).
10I will use the OLS-Regression for simplicity. Following Heckmann (1979) selectivity might cause biased
estimators especially for women. Nevertheless first results show that there a no significant differences of
the estimated return to education wether I use OLS or Heckmann 2 Step estimator.
11See Weber and Wolter (1999) for a review of Switzerland-specific return rates and Weber et al. (2001)
for more recent estimations.
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Table 4: Return to Education
lnwage Coef. SE Coef. SE Coef. SE Coef. SE
A B C D
Education 0.076∗∗ 0.001 0.052∗∗ 0.001 0.051∗∗ 0.001 0.049∗∗ 0.001
Female -0.141∗∗ 0.005 -0.171∗∗ 0.005 -0.158∗∗ 0.005 -0.160∗∗ 0.005
Pot. Exp. 0.032∗∗ 0.001 0.029∗∗ 0.001 0.029∗∗ 0.001 0.029∗∗ 0.001
Pot. Exp.2 -0.001∗∗ 0.000 -0.000∗∗ 0.000 -0.000∗∗ 0.000 -0.000∗∗ 0.000
Tenure 0.005∗∗ 0.001 0.006∗∗ 0.001 0.005∗∗ 0.001 0.006∗∗ 0.001
Tenure2 0.000 0.000 -0.000∗ 0.000 -0.000∗ 0.000 -0.000∗∗ 0.000
Leading Pos. 0.351∗∗ 0.009 0.339∗∗ 0.009 0.335∗∗ 0.009
Academ. Pos. 0.260∗∗ 0.009 0.235∗∗ 0.009 0.229∗∗ 0.009
Technician 0.210∗∗ 0.007 0.175∗∗ 0.008 0.172∗∗ 0.008
Comm. Empl. 0.132∗∗ 0.008 0.092∗∗ 0.008 0.091∗∗ 0.008
Serv. Prov. -0.011 0.009 0.025∗∗ 0.009 0.025∗∗ 0.009
Farmer -0.117∗∗ 0.021 -0.057∗ 0.023 -0.060∗ 0.023
Operator -0.023∗ 0.010 -0.029∗∗ 0.010 -0.025∗ 0.010
Unskilled -0.081∗∗ 0.012 -0.077∗∗ 0.013 -0.078∗∗ 0.012
Years Migra -0.001∗∗ 0.000 -0.001∗∗ 0.000
Year D. yes yes yes yes
Sector D. no no yes yes
Canton D. no no no yes
Constant 2.352∗∗ 0.015 2.564∗∗ 0.015 2.567∗∗ 0.016 2.641∗∗ 0.017
Observations 17’092 17’092 17’092 17’092
R2 0.406 0.488 0.519 0.534
Adj. R2 0.405 0.488 0.518 0.532
Source: SLFS 2002 and 2003, own calculations. + 10% significance, * 5% significance, ** 1% significance
coefficients for experience and tenure are in line with the theory which predicts a positive
but decreasing slope. Interestingly the coefficient for the female dummy is quite high
and significantly negative. Estimating two separate regressions for men and women yields
the same difference in the constant and no significant (on the 5 % level) difference in
the slope coefficient for the return to education.12 Already this lean regression is able
to explain more than 40 % of the total variance of the log wage. Including the job-
position dummies (Panel (B)) seems to be very important, the adjusted R2 increases
by more than 20 %. Additionally all job position dummies but the dummy for Service
Providers are significantly different form the default job position (craftsmen). Because
the position of a job is correlated with the level of education, the slope coefficient of years
of additional education decreases (0.052) but still remains strongly significant. Thus on
the one hand additional education increases the wage through the higher probability of
working in a higher position and on the other hand it also increases the wage directly. All
other variables remain significant and of the same sice as in panel (A). Interestingly, the
inclusion of the job position dummy sharpens the difference between men and women. In
12Results are available on request.
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panel (C) and (D) I include sector dummies and dummies for the cantons. The adjusted
R2 increases slightly, but the variable of main interest, the return to education, is nearly
unaffected. Thus table 4 shows once again the importance of the years of education in
determining the individual wages.
In a next step I show the differences in the return to schooling between ten European
education systems.
4.2 Return to Foreign Education
The main interest of my study are the differences of the education system specific return
to education. For this reason I concentrate on those foreigners who have completed their
education before immigrating to Switzerland. This reduces the sample to almost 3’000
observations. Even though I do not know where these persons have completed their
education I use the nationality as a proxy for the education system.
Table 5: Foreign Education (Baseline Germany)
lnwage Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef.
A B C D
Education 0.049∗∗ 0.037∗∗ 0.035∗∗ 0.036∗∗
Finland 0.017 0.011 0.008 0.004
France 0.019∗∗ 0.013∗ 0.018∗∗ 0.016 ∗∗
UK -0.007 0.001 0.003 0.001
Italy 0.022∗∗ 0.013∗ 0.012∗ 0.012 ∗
Netherl. -0.006 -0.013 -0.020+ -0.025 ∗
Austria 0.006 -0.002 0.000 -0.003
Portugal 0.006 0.003 0.006 0.002
Spain 0.035∗∗ 0.022∗∗ 0.021∗∗ 0.019∗
Turkey 0.017 0.009 0.006 0.002
Country Dummy
Finland -0.031 -0.023 0.002 0.036
France -0.146∗∗ -0.100∗ -0.138∗∗ -0.134∗∗
UK 0.252∗∗ 0.157∗ 0.119+ 0.124+
Italy -0.229∗∗ -0.156∗∗ -0.189∗∗ -0.148∗∗
Netherl. 0.096 0.135 0.181∗ 0.196∗
Austria -0.113 -0.039 0.071 -0.056
Portugal -0.353∗∗ -0.230∗∗ -0.238∗∗ -0.219∗∗
Spain -0.262∗∗ -0.165∗∗ -0.190∗∗ -0.180∗∗
Turkey -0.321∗∗ -0.206∗∗ -0.207∗∗ -0.198∗∗
Job D. no yes yes yes
Sector D. no no yes yes
Canton D. no no no yes
Constant 2.879∗∗ 2.899∗∗ 2.903∗∗ 2.914∗∗
Observations 2’941 2’941 2’941 2’941
R2 0.445 0.515 0.560 0.580
Adj. R2 0.440 0.510 0.552 0.569
Notes: Please find the full table in the appendix (table (9). The control variables used in this regression are:
experience, experience2, tenure, tenure2 and a dummy for sex.
Source: SLFS 2002 and 2003, own calculations.+ 10% significance, * 5% significance, ** 1% significance
In panel (A) of table 5 I show the results of the standard Mincer-equation with the
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exception that I include a country specific dummy and interact the years of schooling with
the nationality. The table reads as follows: a person who finished schooling in Germany
can expect a basic log wage of 2.879 for the compulsory schooling and a return to additional
education by 4.9 % for each additional year of schooling. If a person finished education
in the UK she experiences a basic log wage of 3.131 (2.879+0.252) which is significantly
higher at the 1 % level than the German intercept and a return to additional education of
4.2% (0.049−0.007).13 On the other hand a person who finished schooling in Portugal only
experiences an intercept of 2.526 which is significantly lower than the German intercept
and a return for each additional year of education of 5.5 % (0.049 + 0.006).14 There are
countries with a very low intercept (the countries from southern Europe), but which partly
have a significantly higher return to additional education.15
One explanation might be that persons from this countries are in general less qualified
if they only obtain the compulsory education (which is a part of the intercept), but that
they increase their productivity strongly if they receive additional education. Another
reason might be signalling.16 Persons from this special countries might have a bad signal
which is minor if they achieve further schooling. Winkelmann and Winkelmann (1997)
have shown that in New Zealand the return to education for Maori is higher than for non-
Maori. Thus Maori who usually have only little education, experience a higher penalty on
the labor market outcome in comparison to those with higher education. A third reason
might be selectivity. To control for selectivity I include the job-position dummies. This
reduces the problem of selectivity, because within a job cell the quality of workers should
be comparable.
Adding the job-position dummies reduces the return to additional education for nearly
all education systems for the reasons mentioned above, but all coefficients remain signifi-
cant. (Panel (B)) Additionally the adjusted R2 increases strongly (0.510), thus including
the job-position dummies seems very useful again. As seen before the penalty for women
is high and increases if I include the job position dummies. In Panel (C) and (D) I include
sector dummies and canton dummies which on the one hand rises the explanatory power
of our model and on the other hand does hardly effect the estimated coefficients. Again,
13Please notice that in the text I discuss the point estimates of the country specific dummies and the
slope coefficients even if they are not significant always. One reason might be that there are no differences
another reason might be that there are to little observations. Assuming the latter, the point estimates are
the best estimators.
14One problem might occur because of the languages spoken in Switzerland. It should be easier for
German and Austrian to work in a German speaking part of Switzerland and for French in a French
speaking part of Switzerland due to the languages. But even if I exclude all those foreigners who work in
a canton where their mother-tongue is spoken, the results remain stable.
15This contradicts the findings of de Coulon (1998). He shows that the return to education seems to be
much lower for the traditional immigrants.
16See Spence (1973) for details of the signaling theory.
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the control variables seem to be unaffected by including the additional dummies and are
in line with the theory. The most enriched regression explains far nearly 60% of the total
variation of the wage rate (R2 = 0.580).
These results show first evidence for differences in the value of education obtained in
different education systems. There are education systems with significantly different slopes
and statistically different intercepts. But the country specific intercept contains both:
nation specific characteristics and an education specific return to compulsory education.
To distinguish between the system specific return to basic schooling and the nation specific
fixed characteristics I estimate the same equation using a sample of foreigners who obtained
Swiss education only.
Because all foreigners of different nationalities have obtained the same education, the
remaining differences cannot stem from different basic education. One reason might be
differences in ethnic capital. Ethnic Capital, first mentioned by Borjas (1992), describes
an ethnic spillover effect within an ethnic group. He shows that earnings of a person
are not only affected by parental earnings but also strongly by the mean earnings of the
ethnic group. Bauer and Riphahn (2004) investigate the educational attainment of the
second generation immigrants in Switzerland. They show that the chance of achieving
higher education is strongly correlated with the level of education of the parents. Thus
estimating equation (2) within a sample of foreigners who have obtained Swiss education
only reveals the nationality specific characteristics which should be highly correlated with
the unobserved nationality specific characteristics in the foreign education sample.
Under this assumption, contrasting the intercept of both estimations (Foreign educa-
tion and Swiss education) yields the education specific return to education:
αfj = ν
f
j + ηj
αsj = ν
s
j + ηj
with αfj = α
f + δfj as country specific intercept of country j estimated with foreigners
attended foreign education. (f indicates the coefficients estimated with the foreign edu-
cation sample, while s indicates coefficients estimated with Swiss education sample) αsj
denotes the country specific intercept of country j estimated with foreigners attended
Swiss education. νij (i ∈ [f, s]) reports the return to basic education, while ηj denotes the
nation specific characteristics.
αfj − αsj = νfj − νsj + ηj − ηj = νfj − νsj = νj (3)
This difference reveals the relative return to basic education of country j in compar-
ison to the Swiss education (νj). This approach is comparable to the Oaxaca-Blinder
decomposition (Oaxaca (1973)).17
Table 6 shows the results for all foreigners who attended only Swiss education.
17For the slope coefficient the analysis is slightly different. If the nation specific characteristics and the
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Table 6: Swiss Education (Baseline Germany)
lnwage Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef.
A B C D
Education 0.063∗∗ 0.034∗ 0.034∗ 0.034∗
Finland 0.011 0.017 0.015 0.001
France -0.029 -0.025 -0.020 -0.018
UK -0.006 0.018 -0.003 -0.007
Italy 0.002 0.010 0.012 0.011
Netherl. -0.016 0.010 -0.001 0.007
Austria 0.050 0.054+ 0.047 0.051
Portugal 0.040 0.034 0.028 0.031
Spain 0.003 0.009 0.010 0.010
Turkey 0.035 0.044 0.035 0.031
Country D.
Finland 0.140 0.046 0.091 0.235
France 0.125 0.118 0.116 0.107
UK 0.273 0.114 0.204 0.236
Italy -0.029 -0.068 -0.074 -0.045
Netherl. 0.086 -0.175 -0.047 -0.081
Austria -0.150 -0.152 -0.108 -0.085
Portugal -0.093 -0.102 -0.068 -0.068
Spain 0.013 -0.026 -0.024 -0.021
Turkey -0.142 -0.172 -0.134 -0.114
Job D. no yes yes yes
Sector D. no no yes yes
Constant 2.546∗∗ 2.801∗∗ 2.770∗∗ 2.792∗∗
Canton D. no no no yes
Observations 550 550 550 550
R2 0.421 0.511 0.535 0.557
Adj. R2 0.394 0.479 0.491 0.491
Notes: Please find the full table in the appendix (table (10). The control variables used in this regression are:
experience, experience2, tenure, tenure2 and a dummy for sex.
Source: SLFS 2002 and 2003, own calculations.+ 10% significance, * 5% significance, ** 1% significance
A first very interesting result is that the education specific coefficients do differ while
the coefficients of the control variables differ only a little.18 In contrast there are differences
in the return to compulsory education and the return to additional education between
both tables. While table 5 shows significantly different coefficients, there are no statistical
differences in table 6.
Comparing the level of the coefficients in panel (A) of both tables shows an interesting
result. While the return to education is below 5 % for foreigners with foreign education, it
years of schooling are correlated the return to additional schooling (βj = β1 + γj) is biased. (Card (1994),
Blackburn and Neumark (1993)) It is a well known result that βˆj = βj +
cov(Si,ηj)
V ar(Si)
is only unbiased if the
years of schooling are uncorrelated with the nationality specific characteristics. Assuming that ηj is the
same for foreigners with Swiss education as well as foreigners with foreign education, it depends on the
variance and the covariance if the difference of the slope coefficients eliminates the bias. This is only the
case if the fraction is stable within one nationality. Unfortunately this cannot be solved empirically. Thus
for the latter I assume that taking differences will remove the bias.
18See table 9 and table 10 in the Appendix.
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is above 6% for foreigners with Swiss education. This might be evidence for the hypothesis
that human capital is not perfectly transferable between countries. The result is in line
with the findings of de Coulon (2001). He shows that in general the return to schooling
obtained in Switzerland is higher than the return obtained in the home country. He also
shows that the return to schooling in Switzerland is much lower for immigrants from the
traditional immigration countries. Adding the job position dummies in panel (B) to (D)
captures the advantages of the Swiss education.
Using the results of table 6 we can distinguish between the differences in the education
systems and the differences because of nation specific characteristics. For this purpose I
use equation (3) to calculate the return to basic education and the return to additional
education unaffected by the nation specific characteristics. This comparison (table 719
sharpens the picture seen before. It shows that there are huge differences in the return to
compulsory education net of nationality specific characteristics (SD = 0.167). This might
be evidence for the different economic value of the basic education of different education
systems in the Swiss labor market. Additionally the analysis shows that there are some
countries with relatively high returns to compulsory schooling but mostly lower returns
to additional schooling. The traditional immigration countries have a lower return to
compulsory schooling and a higher return to additional schooling.
Table 7: Foreign & Swiss Education: Basic & Return
Basic Education Return
Foreign Swiss Diff. Foreign Swiss Diff. PISA
Germany 2.903 2.801 0.102 0.035 0.034 0.001 492.67
Finland 2.905 2.847 0.058 0.042 0.051 -0.009 542.50
France 2.766 2.919 -0.153 0.052 0.009 0.043 506.67
UK 3.023 2.915 0.108 0.037 0.052 -0.015 528.00
Italy 2.714 2.733 -0.019 0.047 0.044 0.003 475.33
Netherl. 3.084 2.626 0.458 0.015 0.044 -0.029 525.00
Austria 2.833 2.649 0.184 0.034 0.088 -0.054 504.83
Portugal 2.665 2.699 -0.034 0.041 0.068 -0.027 465.50
Spain 2.714 2.775 -0.061 0.056 0.043 0.013 485.50
Turkey 2.696 2.629 0.067 0.040 0.078 -0.038 432.67
Source: SLFS 2002 and 2003, PISA 2000 and PISA 2003 own calculations.
Note: The PISA scores are calculated as the average score of PISA 2000 and PISA 2003 averaged over
the three disciplines. The analysis for the return relies on the strong assumption that the bias within the
Swiss education estimation and the foreign education estimation is the same.
19Even though not all coefficients are significant I use the point estimates for this comparison.
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4.3 Comparison with PISA and usual return rates
A very different approach to analyze the quality of education is the PISA (Programme
for International Student Assessment) approach. The goal of PISA is to compare the
education systems in more than 40 countries. The study started in 2000, has been repeated
in 2003 and will be repeated again in 2006. In all participating countries 15-year old pupils
have to solve standardized tests in reading, mathematics and sciences. The result is a
huge number of test scores which can be collapsed into three different scores for the three
disciplines (OECD (2002) and OECD (2004)).
In this section I compare the economic value of education of different education sys-
tems with the school achievement measured by PISA. In a very recent study Blau and
Kahn (2005) have shown using the International Adult Literacy Scores, which allows for
controlling the cognitive skills of adults across countries, that an increase in the test scores
raises wages significantly.
The last column of table 7 shows the average PISA scores of the countries of interest.
Because PISA 2000 and 2003 provides three different scores for reading, mathematics and
sciences, I construct an aggregated score with equal weights for all categories.20 To com-
pare the PISA scores with the returns to different education systems I use the returns to
compulsory schooling (diminished by the nationality specific characteristics). The reason
is that in most of the countries the compulsory schooling lasts until the 15th or 16th
birthday. Because PISA asks 15 year old pupil to answer the questions, this comparison
seems to be appropriate.
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Figure 3: Basic Education vs. PISA Score (ρ=0.344)
20A factor analysis has shown that the correlation between the three subject is between 0.95 and 0.99.
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Figure 3 shows the plot of the return to basic education against the average PISA
scores. There exists a positive correlation between both scores (ρ = 0.344). Excluding
Turkey (all Turks in the dataset I use have completed only 5 years of compulsory schooling)
increases the correlation above 0.450.21 This result can be deemed to be an indicator that
the content of the schooling test is a good measure for the economic value of education.22
A comparison of the returns to additional education with the returns to education
provided in table (1) allows for evaluation of the results. The estimates in table (1) might
be biased due to ability and selectivity and a cross country comparison might be biased
due to country specific labor markets. In contrast my results are estimated within the
same labor market and after inclusion of the job position dummy partly controlled for
selectivity. Table (8) provides this correlations.
Table 8: Comparison: Return to Education
Men Women
col (1) of table (1) -0.277 0.005
col (3) of table (1) 0.136 0.232
Source: Harmon and Westergaard-Nielsen (2001), SLFS 2002 and 2003, own calculations.
Note: Please notice that Turkey was not part of the PURE project and thus it is not included in this
comparison. Because I do not estimate separate regressions for men and women, I show both correlations.
At first glance the correlations are at a low degree but slightly higher for women.
Using the estimates of column (1) of table (5) the correlations is even negative for man,
but after inclusion of dummies for the job position and the sectors, it turns positive. The
main conclusion of this analysis is that there are huge differences between both estimation
methods. This might be evidence for the hypothesis that a comparison across countries
with different labor market institutions does not reflect the true differences of the returns
to education.
5 Conclusion
In the economic literature there exists a lot of studies which have tried to calculate the
return to education and to compare the returns between countries. This study is the
first which compares the value of different education systems within one labor market and
21Using the differences of the returns to additional education for the comparison with PISA, the results
is slightly weaker (ρ = 0.154). But notice that (1) PISA analysis the quality of the basic education and
not of further education and (2) that the returns estimated in this study are likely to be biased.
22This implication is only true if the value of an education system is stable over time, because I compare
at least two different cohorts. While the PISA pupils are born after 1985, the workers I use in the analysis
are born between 1938 and 1987.
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thus reduces biases due to different institutions and other country specific characteristics.
I use the Mincerian wage equation to estimate returns to education in Switzerland and
especially returns to foreign education in Switzerland. Using employees in Switzerland
who have completed education in their home country results show that there are indeed
very different returns for different education systems. I also show that there are huge and
significant differences for the return to compulsory education. I use estimates of foreigners
who attend Swiss schooling to calculate the effect of country specific characteristics to
reveal the true effect of compulsory education. This analysis shows that there are some
countries with relatively high returns to compulsory schooling but mostly lower returns to
additional schooling.
A correlation with the PISA scores shows that the schooling test seems to measure the
economic value of education slightly good. The comparison of the returns to education
shows that different labor markets might bias the cross country relation.
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A Appendix
A.1 Additional Tables
Table 9: Foreign Education (Baseline Germany)
lnwage Coef. SE Coef. SE Coef. SE Coef. SE
A B C D
Education 0.049∗∗ 0.004 0.037∗∗ 0.004 0.035∗∗ 0.004 0.036∗∗ 0.004
Finland 0.017 0.024 0.011 0.023 0.008 0.022 0.004 0.022
France 0.019∗∗ 0.006 0.013∗ 0.006 0.018∗∗ 0.006 0.016∗∗ 0.006
UK -0.007 0.009 0.001 0.009 0.003 0.008 0.001 0.008
Italy 0.022∗∗ 0.005 0.013∗ 0.005 0.012∗ 0.005 0.012∗ 0.005
Netherl. -0.006 0.013 -0.013 0.012 -0.020+ 0.012 -0.025∗ 0.012
Austria 0.006 0.011 -0.002 0.011 0.000 0.010 -0.003 0.010
Portugal 0.006 0.010 0.003 0.009 0.006 0.009 0.002 0.009
Spain 0.035∗∗ 0.009 0.022∗∗ 0.008 0.021∗∗ 0.008 0.019∗ 0.008
Turkey 0.017 0.011 0.009 0.011 0.006 0.010 0.002 0.010
Country D.
Finland -0.031 0.190 -0.023 0.178 0.002 0.170 0.036 0.170
France -0.146∗∗ 0.046 -0.100∗ 0.043 -0.138∗∗ 0.042 -0.134∗∗ 0.043
UK 0.252∗∗ 0.076 0.157∗ 0.072 0.119+ 0.069 0.124+ 0.068
Italy -0.229∗∗ 0.036 -0.156∗∗ 0.035 -0.189∗∗ 0.033 -0.148∗∗ 0.033
Netherl. 0.096 0.097 0.135 0.091 0.181∗ 0.087 0.196∗ 0.086
Austria -0.113 0.074 -0.039 0.069 -0.071 0.066 -0.056 0.066
Portugal -0.353∗∗ 0.038 -0.230∗∗ 0.037 -0.238∗∗ 0.036 -0.219∗∗ 0.037
Spain -0.262∗∗ 0.046 -0.165∗∗ 0.043 -0.190∗∗ 0.042 -0.180∗∗ 0.042
Turkey -0.321∗∗ 0.064 -0.206∗∗ 0.060 -0.207∗∗ 0.058 -0.198∗∗ 0.057
Female -0.161∗∗ 0.013 -0.180∗∗ 0.013 -0.168∗∗ 0.013 -0.170∗∗ 0.013
Pot. Exp. 0.028∗∗ 0.003 0.026∗∗ 0.002 0.028∗∗ 0.002 0.029∗∗ 0.002
Pot. Exp.2 -0.001∗∗ 0.000 -0.000∗∗ 0.000 -0.000∗∗ 0.000 -0.001∗∗ 0.000
Tenure 0.008∗∗ 0.002 0.007∗∗ 0.002 0.007∗∗ 0.002 0.006∗∗ 0.002
Tenure2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Leading Pos. 0.374∗∗ 0.024 0.371∗∗ 0.025 0.372∗∗ 0.024
Academ. Pos. 0.216∗∗ 0.023 0.209∗∗ 0.023 0.219∗∗ 0.023
Technician 0.225∗∗ 0.021 0.202∗∗ 0.022 0.214∗∗ 0.022
Comm. Empl. 0.110∗∗ 0.024 0.096∗∗ 0.025 0.102∗∗ 0.024
Serv. Prov. -0.044∗ 0.022 0.032 0.024 0.047+ 0.024
Farmer -0.214∗∗ 0.063 -0.025 0.073 -0.014 0.072
Operator -0.016 0.026 -0.013 0.025 0.006 0.025
Unskilled -0.090∗∗ 0.031 -0.057+ 0.031 -0.038 0.031
Years Migra -0.001 0.001 -0.001 0.001
Year D. yes yes yes yes
Sector D. no no yes yes
Canton D. no no no yes
Constant 2.879∗∗ 0.080 2.899∗∗ 0.077 2.903∗∗ 0.076 2.914∗∗ 0.075
Observations 2’941 2’941 2’941 2’941
R2 0.445 0.515 0.560 0.580
Adj. R2 0.440 0.510 0.552 0.569
Source: SLFS 2002 and 2003, own calculations.+ 10% significance, * 5% significance, ** 1% significance
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Table 10: Swiss Education (Baseline Germany)
lnwage Coef. SE Coef. SE Coef. SE Coef. SE
A B C D
Education 0.063∗∗ 0.015 0.034∗ 0.014 0.034∗ 0.015 0.034∗ 0.015
Finland 0.011 0.058 0.017 0.054 0.015 0.054 0.001 0.057
France -0.029 0.026 -0.025 0.025 -0.020 0.025 -0.018 0.025
UK -0.006 0.035 0.018 0.033 -0.003 0.033 -0.007 0.033
Italy 0.002 0.017 0.010 0.016 0.012 0.016 0.011 0.016
Netherl. -0.016 0.036 0.010 0.034 -0.001 0.036 0.007 0.037
Austria 0.050 0.034 0.054+ 0.032 0.047 0.032 0.051 0.032
Portugal 0.040 0.049 0.034 0.045 0.028 0.045 0.031 0.046
Spain 0.003 0.019 0.009 0.018 0.010 0.018 0.010 0.018
Turkey 0.035 0.030 0.044 0.028 0.035 0.028 0.031 0.029
Country D.
Finland 0.140 0.335 0.046 0.312 0.091 0.309 0.235 0.316
France 0.125 0.155 0.118 0.145 0.116 0.144 0.107 0.149
UK 0.273 0.199 0.114 0.186 0.204 0.187 0.236 0.189
Italy -0.029 0.103 -0.068 0.096 -0.074 0.096 -0.045 0.099
Netherl. 0.086 0.255 -0.175 0.238 -0.047 0.255 -0.081 0.264
Austria -0.150 0.207 -0.152 0.192 -0.108 0.194 -0.085 0.196
Portugal -0.093 0.154 -0.102 0.144 -0.068 0.143 -0.068 0.151
Spain 0.013 0.116 -0.026 0.109 -0.024 0.109 -0.021 0.113
Turkey -0.142 0.131 -0.172 0.123 -0.134 0.122 -0.114 0.129
Female -0.143∗∗ 0.027 -0.164∗∗ 0.027 -0.165∗∗ 0.028 -0.166∗∗ 0.029
Pot. Exp. 0.033∗∗ 0.006 0.035∗∗ 0.005 0.036∗∗ 0.005 0.037∗∗ 0.005
Pot. Exp.2 -0.001∗∗ 0.000 -0.001∗∗ 0.000 -0.001∗∗ 0.000 -0.001∗∗ 0.000
Tenure 0.005 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.004 0.006 0.004 0.006
Tenure2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Leading Pos. 0.333∗∗ 0.050 0.329∗∗ 0.052 0.330∗∗ 0.054
Academ. Pos. 0.271∗∗ 0.042 0.254∗∗ 0.045 0.260∗∗ 0.046
Technician 0.229∗∗ 0.036 0.190∗∗ 0.039 0.187∗∗ 0.040
Comm. Empl. 0.133∗∗ 0.038 0.105* 0.041 0.105* 0.041
Serv. Prov. -0.004 0.042 0.017 0.046 0.023 0.047
Farmer -0.171 0.151 -0.132 0.162 -0.06 0.168
Operator 0.06 0.055 0.06 0.057 0.057 0.062
Unskilled -0.085 0.104 -0.101 0.104 -0.089 0.106
Year D. yes yes yes yes
Sector D. no no yes yes
Canton D. no no no yes
Constant 2.546∗∗ 0.236 2.801∗∗ 0.223 2.770∗∗ 0.225 2.792∗∗ 0.233
Observations 550 550 550 550
R2 0.421 0.511 0.535 0.557
Adj. R2 0.394 0.479 0.491 0.491
Source: SLFS 2002 and 2003, own calculations.+ 10% significance, * 5% significance, ** 1% significance
A.2 The Country Specific Education Systems
In this section I very briefly describe the different education systems of the countries of
interest.23 Because of the very different education systems I concentrate on the main
routes. In a second part I provide different returns to education estimated in former
studies.
23The information is mainly based on the description provided by http://www.dija.de/ (08.12.2004) and
http://bildungssysteme-international.dipf.de/ (08.12.2004).
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Austria
In Austria the compulsory school takes 9 years from age 6 to age 15. It starts with a
four year primary education which is the same for all pupils. After this they can chose
between three types of schooling. Either they join a lower secondary school (4 years)
and an additional year in a polytechnic course which qualifies for lower apprenticeship
or join a 6 year secondary school which allows for higher apprenticeships. The different
types of apprenticeship last between two and four years. The third choice is the academic
secondary school which lasts for additional 8 years and qualifies for university. This is
usually followed by an tertiary education provided by an university which lasts for four
to five years. Additional university alumni have the chance to join doctoral courses which
lasts for at least 2 years. Beside the university there are other non academic education
like polytechnic college with a duration of three or four years.
Finland
In Finland the compulsory school takes 9 years from age 7 to age 16 which provides the
basic education. This is either followed by three years of vocational training or three years
of secondary education. After vocational training the students have the possibility to join
an additional three to four year lasting polytechnic education. Students who finished the
secondary school have the permission to enter university and finish after three years with
a lower degree (BA) or after five years with a higher degree (MA). Additional it is possible
to add a doctoral study which last for at least three years.
France
In France the compulsory school takes from age 6 to age 16. It contains five years of
primary education and is followed by a four years lasting secondary education. Beside
this main track it is possible to join a polytechnic school for the eighth and ninth year.
The nine years of schooling are followed by either a vocational education (apprenticeship
with work experience and additional schooling) or a higher secondary education for those
who have finished the secondary school. The last track is very popular in France; about
75 % chose this education. After this higher secondary school education is continued at
university. After two additional years the only selection process selects the best students
to finish the Grande Ecole after all in all five years of university education. Other student
can leave university after three or four years.
Germany
In Germany the compulsory school takes 9 years from age 6 to age 15. For those who leave
school with 15 three additional years of apprenticeship (including vocational schooling)
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are mandatory. After four years of primary education the pupils are divided into three
groups. One group joins the lower secondary education which last for five to six years and
meets in lower apprenticeship. Another group receives secondary education on a six year
high school which allows for higher apprenticeships. The bests pupils join the nine year
high school which allows studies at a university. Studies at a university lasts four to five
years and can be completed with a doctoral study which lasts for at least three additional
years. Beside university there exist technical colleges which all pupils who have finished
the twelfth year of schooling can enter. Studies at technical colleges last three or four
years.
Italy
In Italy the compulsory school takes 8 years from age 6 to age 14 and is divided in a
primary part (5 years) and a lower secondary part (3 years). After completing compulsory
education and passing the lower secondary leaving examination, young people may enter
one of the five types of upper secondary education courses lasting five (university qualifica-
tion), four or three years (vocational education). There is no further vocational education
in Italy. After completing the five year higher secondary education students have the pos-
sibility to enter university and finish between two and three years (lower level) and four
to six years (regular level).
Netherlands
In the Netherlands the compulsory school takes 12 years from age 4 to age 16. There
is a part-time compulsory school until the age 18. The primary education lasts 8 years
and is cut into two parts per four years. After these eight years the students can chose
between four different schools (since August 1999 the two lower levels are aggregated)
which lead into a vocational training (with age 16) a higher vocational training with age
17 or studies at university (with age 18). The vocational training either contains 70% of
schooling and 30% of work or 30% of schooling and 70% work and lasts for two to three
years. The studies at university lasts between four and five years and can be completed
with a doctoral study.
Portugal
In Portugal the compulsory school takes 9 years from age 6 to age 15. It is divided in six
years of primary education and three years of lower secondary education. Upper secondary
education provides five different types which last for three years and qualify for university
or technical college, last for three years and contains vocational education, or last for
four years (apprenticeship). At university students have the choice between a three years
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study (lower grade) or a four to six year study (regular grade). After the latter there is
the possibility to acquire a higher degree with two additional years or a PhD with four
additional years.
Spain
In Spain the compulsory school takes 10 years from age 6 to age 16. The primary edu-
cation lasts six years and is followed by a four year secondary education. These 10 years
are integrated. After this 10 years of compulsory education the students can choose be-
tween vocational training or high school which qualifies for university. Both types last for
additional two years. The tertiary education is dived in a advanced vocational training
a non-university study or an university study. All three types last for three years while
there is the possibility of two to three additional years at university which can be followed
by another two years of doctoral study.
Turkey
Since 1997 the compulsory school in Turkey takes 8 years (5 years before) from age 7
to age 15. This is divided in a five years lasting primary education and a three years
lasting secondary education. Most of the Turkish pupils leave the education after the
compulsory school because there is no vocational training. Those who want to get higher
education can add additional three years which are required to enter university or technical
college. This step lasts two years at the technical college and six years at university which
can be completed with a doctoral study. All Turkish immigrants used for this analysis
have completed compulsory schooling before 1997 and thus attended at least 5 years of
education.
UK
In the UK the compulsory school takes 11 years from age 5 to age 16.24 There are two
secondary education levels from age 11 to age 16 and another one from age 17 to age
18. For those who leave schools with age 16 there is the possibility of a two years lasting
vocational training. Those who joined the second step of secondary education have the
permission to enter university and can either acquire a bachelor. The third step of the
education system is either a vocational education or a university education. The vocational
training lasts for two years, the university education can be finished with a bachelor degree
after three years. With another two years Students can leave university with a masters
degree, which permits for a doctoral study and lasts between three and four years.
24There are some deviating rules for Northern Ireland or Scotland which I skip in this brief section.
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